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While the case for decline in American associational life has not been proven, there are a number 
of trends that indicate a lower stock of social capital among at least parts of American society.  
International comparisons of civil society reveal interesting and often paradoxical trends, but 
suggest that perhaps the US is not alone in facing a problem in the values and associations on 
which healthy democratic government depends.  The US presents a rather confusing picture.  
Empirical data does not clearly suggest that civil society is in decline, but there is a strong 
popular perception that it is, evidenced, among other things, by the responsive chord struck by 
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Robert Putnam's now familiar 1995 article "Bowling Alone." Expressions of cynicism and 
distrust have dramatically displaced respect for authority in American popular culture, 
suggesting some sort of erosion of civil society.  It is clear that many of the phenomena 
suggested by the Putnam debate characterize other industrialized societies as well.   
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Full Text: 
 
Global Trends and US Civil Society  
 
Modern liberal states require healthy civil societies for their long-run stability-under a system of 
limited government, society must be self-organizing to fulfill a variety of social needs. 
Furthermore, the democratic process requires citizens to organize if they are to represent their 
passions and interests effectively in the political marketplace. Civil society presupposes 
social capital-the norms and values that permit cooperative behavior on the part of groups. The 
assertions that American civil society is ailing and that American social capital has been depleted 
have been put forward in recent years, most notably by Robert Putnam. While the case for 
decline in American associational life has not been proven, there are number of trends that 
indicate a lower stock of social capital among at least parts of American society. International 
comparisons of civil society reveal interesting and often paradoxical trends, but suggest that 
perhaps the United States is not alone in facing a problems in the values and associations on 
which healthy democratic government depends.  
 
 
Individualism and hostility to authority are deeply ingrained themes in American political 
culture. Nevertheless, Alexis de Tocqueville and many other acute observers of American social 
life have noted that Americans often unite in voluntary social groups to achieve social and 
political objectives. This is not the paradox it seems to be-for most Americans, individualism 
means hostility to ascribed social status, coupled with the belief that individuals should be free to 
choose their own social attachments. 
American individualism has seldom involved hostility to community life altogether. The 
individualism embedded in the US Declaration of Independence and the US Constitution, as well 
as in the Lockean tradition of liberalism on which these documents are founded, is 
counterbalanced by a sectarian Protestant tradition that fosters cooperation in small voluntary 
organizations.  The secular voluntary associationsnon-governmental organizations (NGOs), 
labor unions, and activist groups-which today comprise American civil society are the heirs of 
this religious heritage.  
 
The Putnam Debate  
 
Any contemporary discussion of the state of American civil society must begin with the 
controversy engendered by Robert Putnam's 1995 article "Bowling Alone." In a now familiar 
argument, Putnam relied on a wide variety of empirical measures of social capital and argued 
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that America's traditional “art of association" has been in decline since the mid-1960s.  
 
Putnam relies on two sorts of data. The first is survey data concerning numbers and types of 
organizations to which respondents belong and their attitudes about trust, other people's honesty, 
and the like. The second type of data concerns the numbers of groups in various regions or 
countries and their membership trends over time. Together, these statistics are taken as indicators 
of social capital.  
 
The survey data on trust shows an unambiguous decline between the early 1960s and the early 
1990s. The largest declines concern trust in public institutions, such as Congress, the President, 
and "government" in general.  In 1960, 70 percent of Americans polled said that they expected 
their government to "do the right thing." By 1990, only 19 percent shared that sentiment.  Levels 
of interpersonal trust have exhibited similar, though somewhat less dramatic, trends. In 1965, 58 
percent of Americans indicated that they trusted their fellow citizens. By 1991, that majority had 
dwindled to a 37 percent minority.  
 
Putnam also cites declines in the memberships of organizations such as the Boy Scouts, the Red 
Cross, parent-teacher associations, and the so called "animal organizations"-traditional service 
groups such as the Elks, the Kiwanis, and the Lions-that were an important aspect of social life 
in earlier generations, especially for men. The data on group memberships is ambiguous, 
however, and subject to what are perhaps insuperable problems of measurement.  
 
Putnam has been criticized on both empirical and normative grounds. Numerous scholars have 
pointed to a significant number of surveys showing that groups and group membership may have 
actually increased over the time period covered by Putnam, particularly for younger Americans. 
Other academics suggest that many important qualitative aspects of civic engagement are not 
reflected in the available data. It is entirely possible, for example, that people are more actively 
involved in a smaller number of organizations. One recent study of civic engagement in 
Philadelphia pointed to the fact that while expressed cynicism is up, time spent by people in 
community organizations has increased.  
 
[IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH] Captioned as: A healthy democracy requires a vibrant civic society.  
 
Data on declining groups and group memberships may be misleading for other reasons as well. 
First, newly formed groups tend to be poorly organized and hence less likely to keep good 
statistical information on themselves or to be included in surveys of group membership. 
Researchers learned of the membership decline among the Freemasons and Shriners only 
because those groups are wellestablished and keep good records. Much less is known, on the 
other hand, about the many informal support groups that formed in response to the AIDS 
epidemic over the past decade and a half. In addition, for a large number of informal social 
networks, no data exists at all. Alcoholics Anonymous, for example, deliberately refuses to keep 
membership statistics. 
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In a society with a constant level of group turnover, available data would always tend to show 
decline because of the lack of data on newer groups. 
 
The Bad Apple Effect  
 
Group membership statistics do not fully measure the effects of associations on civil life. Not all 
groups contribute positively to society. Some-such as the Ku Klux Klan, organized crime, or the 
Nation of Islam-breed distrust and hatred or are actively engaged in criminal activity. In addition, 
groups with more benign purposes can nonetheless be problematic from the standpoint of 
democratic governance. Mancur Olson has argued that societies-particularly modern welfare 
states-tend to accumulate rent-seeking interest groups whose primary goal is to win state 
subsidies for their members, a dynamic that contributes to economic and political stagnation. 
Several observers have argued that there can be such a thing as "too much civil society." In a 
highly politicized society where interest groups are actively represented, the political process is 
often not focused on the national interest and can become mired in socially inefficient, 
special-interest politicking.  The expansion of well-organized, well-funded interest-group 
lobbying in Washington over the past few decades would hardly have given Tocqueville-or any 
other proponent of American democracy-cause to celebrate.  
 
To measure the social capital derived from association accurately, one must distinguish between 
groups that produce negative and positive externalities.  While all groups require some degree of 
social capital to operate, hate groups actively destroy trust and social capital outside of their 
membership. 
 
On the other hand, some organizations contribute to social capital by building bonds of trust that 
benefit society at large. As the German sociologist Max Weber noted, America's historical 
Puritan ethic mandated honesty not simply toward other members of one's religious community, 
but toward all human beings. Norms of reciprocity, however, can be only shared effectively 
among a small subset of a group's members. While groups Putnam terms "membership groups," 
such as the American Association of Retired People (AARP), often have huge memberships, 
there is no reason to think that any two given members of such a group will trust one another or 
engage in coordinated action just because they pay annual dues to the same organization. The 
fact that, of all groups in the United States, the AARP has a membership second in size only to 
the Catholic Church, should therefore not be weighed heavily in evaluating its contribution to the 
nation's civil society. The exclusion of such "membership groups" strengthens Putnam's case but 
does not explain why voluntary activities seem to be increasing in some sectors of American 
society.  
 
The United States thus presents a rather confusing picture. Empirical data does not clearly 
suggest that civil society is in decline, but there is a strong popular perception that it is, 
evidenced, among other things, by the responsive chord struck by Putnam's original article. As 
anyone who experiences contemporary American society knows, expressions of cynicism and 
distrust have dramatically displaced respect for authority in American popular culture, 
suggesting some sort of erosion of civil society.  
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International Comparisons  
 
How does the United States compare to other societies in terms of the health of its civil society 
and the prevalence of social values such as trust and willingness to cooperate? One source of 
very relevant data is the long-running World Values Survey conducted by the University of 
Michigan. This survey asked respondents in 43 countries a long series of value-related questions 
in both 1981 and 1991.  
 
The results of the University of Michigan study confirm that the United States remains a trusting 
place relative to other countries, as the accompanying chart shows, despite the fact that trust may 
have declined in the United States. The data also confirms a common observation that Latin 
Catholic countries tend to be more atomized and less trusting than Protestant ones: of the eleven 
countries with a Christian cultural heritage, the five most trusting are majority Protestant and five 
of the six least trusting are majority Catholic.  
 
[IMAGE TABLE] Captioned as: Table 1:  
 
The World Values Survey also addressed levels of civic engagement by asking respondents 
whether they were active members of a variety of organizations, including social welfare, 
religious, cultural, and political groups, as table 1 shows. International data on organizations and 
memberships is more or less consistent with what was said above about the Putnam data on the 
United States: while some types of organizations, including religious groups and trade unions, 
have seen their membership decline during the 1980s, other groups, such as environmental 
organizations, have seen increases.  Japan alone shows a trend of decreasing group membership 
across the board, while South Korea shows a striking pattern of increasing membership. But for 
the most part, developed countries do not exhibit a clear trend toward either declining or 
increasing group activity.  
 
In addition to the general question about the trustworthiness of others noted above, the survey 
asked respondents whether they would engage in certain unethical behaviors such as tax fraud, 
accepting stolen goods, lying, and adultery, as the accompanying table shows. In contrast to the 
group membership data, this ethical data reveals a much clearer pattern: paradoxically, expressed 
levels of generalized trust increased in most countries, while the ethical attitudes that presumably 
produce trust apparently declined. This seems to contradict Putnam's findings. The United States, 
Britain, Canada, Italy, and Germany all exhibit significant declines in self-reported ethical 
attitudes. Japan, on the other hand, showed a small increase in the ethical variables, while Spain 
and particularly South Korea showed extremely large increases. Latin American countries were 
split: Argentina showed large increases in most ethical variables, while Mexico showed equally 
dramatic declines.  
 
America seems to have witnessed a substantial decline in expressed levels of trust, while 
showing ambiguous trends with regard to group membership, a pattern characteristic of other 
developed countries such as Germany, Italy, Sweden, and Canada. This suggests that Putnam is 
wrong in claiming that group membership and trust are positively correlated across societies.  It 
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is possible to have stable or increasing group activity and steadily declining levels of trust and 
ethical behavior. One possible explanation of this apparent paradox is that many of the groups 
that are increasing in membership are the so-called "membership groups" which produce little by 
way of social capital.  
 
Other Measures of Social Capital An alternative to counting groups and group memberships 
exists which may be a more effective metric of the health of American civil society. If it is 
difficult to measure social capital as a positive quantity for the reasons suggested above, it is 
perhaps possible to measure the absence of social capital through what sociologists have 
traditionally labeled "social deviance" statistics-measures of crime, suicide rates, family 
breakdown and illegitimacy, tax evasion, and the like. Deviance data is subject to its own 
measurement problems, but it is far more abundant on a comparative basis than data on group 
memberships.  
 
The problem with using deviance data as a proxy for either social capital or civil society more 
broadly is that it ignores questions of distribution, a problem shared by the Putnam data as well. 
Social capital and the propensity to work cooperatively in the groups that constitute civil society 
are not evenly distributed among different social classes, ethnic groups, or other strata within a 
given society. This problem is especially significant for a large and diverse society such as the 
United States. It has long been recognized, for example, that low-income African-American 
communities tend to be far more atomized and less prone to self-organization than various 
Asian-American communities. Deviance data runs the risk of measuring the absence of social 
capital within those sectors of society that tend to be atomized, while revealing little about other 
parts of the same society. It is perfectly possible that social capital can decline in some sectors 
while increasing in others, a scenario that is quite likely in the case of the United States.  
 
[IMAGE TABLE] Captioned as: Table 2:  
 
With this caveat in mind, behavioral data confirms the trends evident in the World Values 
Survey data on ethical values, as table 2 shows. The incidence of social deviance has grown 
rapidly in virtually all Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
countries since approximately the mid-1960s, with the exception of Japan. This may resolve the 
paradox noted above: stable or ambiguous levels of group memberships exist across different 
societies but are accompanied by increasing levels of expressed distrust and cynicism in those 
same countries.  
 
Like the United States, many developed countries have experienced sharply increasing levels of 
crime and family breakdown. These two types of deviance may not have much of an impact on 
that part of civil society most relevant to the democratic political process-often the province of 
national elites-but they are related to the broader social functions of civil society-the 
socialization and education of children, the maintenance of safe and stable neighborhoods, and 
the like. In the case of the United States, it would seem that much of the decline in expressed 
levels of trust noted by Putnam can be tied directly to social trends of crime and family 
breakdown, and it is at least plausible that a similar process is unfolding in other countries as 
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well. 
 
A Note on Asian Values  
 
One interesting sidelight of the data presented above is the fact that Asian societies seem to defy 
the trends detailed above. Japan and South Korea exhibited large increases in selfdescribed levels 
of ethical behavior in the World Values Survey data between 1981 and 1991, and relatively 
unchanged levels of social deviance. Findings such as these have prompted many to conclude 
that perhaps Asian societies are fundamentally different from other OECD societies.  
 
Asian spokesmen, notably former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore and Mahathir bin 
Muhammed of Malaysia, have been quick to note the difference in deviance levels between their 
societies and those of the West. They have argued that by accepting the economic but not the 
political principles (individualism and democracy) of modernity, countries such as Singapore 
and Malaysia have achieved high standards of living while avoiding many of the social problems 
that plague the United States. The empirical data does suggest that there are important 
differences between Asia and the West in both self-expressed values and actual social behavior.  
 
A more difficult question has to do with the causes of those differences. It is not clear that 
democracy per se is related to social disorganization: Japan, after all, is an Asian country with 
low levels of deviance and workable democratic institutions. Western countries, which are all 
democratic, vary considerably among themselves in levels of deviance. It is quite likely that 
social indicators such as family breakdown and (more weakly) crime are related to narrower 
variables such as female labor-force participation. For reasons that cannot be fully elaborated 
here, the single most important value difference between Asia and the West has to do with the 
role of women. As demographic pressures in Japan and other industrially mature Asian societies 
increase the demand for female labor over the next generation, those societies will likely begin to 
see increases in their deviance indicators.  
 
[IMAGE GRAPH] Captioned as: CAN OTHER PEOPLE BE TRUSTED?  
 
The Global Decline  
 
Academic debate about the state of American civil society has up to now been rather parochial, 
concentrating on trends in US society alone. It is clear, however, that many of the phenomena 
suggested by the Putnam debate characterize other industrialized societies as well. In searching 
for explanations for the shifts in trust levels and social capital, it is critical to avoid excessively 
insular explanations that relate only to the particular history and experiences of the United States. 
The Vietnam War, Watergate, IranContra, and other US political developments are not sufficient 
to give an account of increasing levels of cynicism and distrust in Italy and Australia. While 
we might be tempted to give country-by-country accounts of why levels of trust and ethical 
behavior began to deteriorate-distrust in Italy, one might be tempted to argue, increased because 
of the revelations of public corruption arising from the ongoing Tangentopoli investigations-it is 
striking that these indicators began to move more or less in tandem for a wide range of countries 
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over the past two decades. This suggests that a larger socioeconomic process has been at work, 
disrupting civil society in all of these countries, one that has nonetheless been avoided by Asia's 
culturally distinct societies. 
 
FRANCIS FUKUYAMA is Hirst Professor of Public Policy and Director of George 
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